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RECENT DECISIONS
The standard of care laid out by the court in the instant case is of
itself reasonable. The existence of a grade crossing should elicit caution
from the motorist encountering it. The precautions of looking and lis-
tening, and even stopping when necessary are slight burdens on the trav-
eler when compared to the consequences of meeting a train upon the
crossing. The application of the standard to particular fact situations
presents problems. If contributory negligence operates as a complete de-
fense, the failure of courts to distinguish between the theories of inter-
vening cause and contributory negligence will not affect the outcome of
a particular case. Both theories would operate to deny recovery. How-
ever, if the comparative negligence doctrine is applicable, the distinction
is important. If contributory negligence is treated as an intervening
cause, it will still operate as a total bar to recovery. Properly viewed,
the negligence of each of the parties should be treated as a proximate
cause, with contributory negligence merely serving to mitigate damages.
LAWRENCE H. SVERDRUP.
DECISION OF INDIAN TRIBAL COURT HELD REvIEWABLE THROUGH FED-
ERAL DISTRICT COURT HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING.-An Indian woman
sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court claiming she was
illegally detained by order of the Court of Indian Offenses, Ft. Belknap
Jurisdiction, United States Indian Service. The district court held it had
no jurisdiction to determine the legality of the decision. On appeal to
federal circuit court, Held: Remanded to district court for a hearing on its
merits. Although Indian tribal courts have been considered courts of in-
dependent sovereigns over which federal courts had no jurisdiction, the
Indian court in question was in fact an arm of the federal government.
The federal district court, in a habeas corpus proceeding had jurisdic-
tion to inquire into the legality of the tribal court's decision. Colliflower
v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
Federal courts have consistently held that they have no jurisdiction
over Indian tribal courts. The rationale for this is as follows:
(1) An Indian tribe possessed, in the first instance, all the powers
of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest rendered the tribe subject
to the legislative power of the United States and, in substance,
terminated the external powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g.,
its power to enter into treaties with foreign nations, but did not
by itself terminate the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its
powers of local self-government. (3) These internal powers were,
of course, subject to qualification by treaties and by express
legislation of Congress, but save as thus expressly qualified, many
powers of internal sovereignty have remained in Indian tribes
and in their duly constituted organs of government.'
'DnP'T OF THE SOLICITOR, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 398 (1958)
(hereinafter cited as FEDERAL INDIAN LAW).
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As a result of the sovereignty theory, except for acts which are consid-
ered federal crimes, Indian courts have had exclusive jurisdiction over
members of Indian tribes for acts committed on Indian lands.
2
Indian tribal courts are not courts of sovereign nations as they are
purported to be. Rather, they are the creation of the executive branch
of the United States government and are controlled by it for all practical
purposes. The first courts ire originated by Indian agents to maintain
law and order on the various reservations.3 Congress in turn recognized
their existence by the appropriation of money for them,4 and the courts
sustained their legality on the basis that they were educational instru-
mentalities used by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in its role of guardian
to the Indian.5 Thus, Indian courts are organized by an executive branch
of the government, are sustained with money appropriated for their use
by Congress, and are legally approved by federal court decisions!, It is
clear, then, that a federal agency, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, is the
controlling force in Indian courts, rather than the sovereign Indian na-
tion itself.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs controls all facets of life on the Indian
reservation. In the early part of the nineteenth century Congress gave
the Bureau the management of all Indian affairs and all matters arising
out of Indian relations.7 Since that time the Bureau has effectively con-
trolled the Indians under its jurisdiction through the use of regulations
which it promulgated. Although these regulations were not expressly
authorized by Congress they were sustained by the courts because they
were useful in "educating" the Indian.8
The Indian tribes are still largely controlled by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. For example, the Bureau's regulations provide jail sentences for
such diverse offenses as misbranding,9 carrying a concealed weapon,' 0 or
2Crimes over which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction are murder, man-
slaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, burglary, robbery, larceny, assault with a
dangerous weapon, arson and incest. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1958). The Assimilative
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1958), which adopted state criminal law for federal
reservations within the states was held applicable to Indian crimes on tribal reserva-
tions in Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (1946). However, federal courts
do not have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes of this type and if an Indian is tried
in tribal court he may not be retried in federal court as this would be double jeopardy.
United States v. La Plant, 156 F. Supp. 660 (D. Mont. 1957).
'FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 570.
442 STAT. 208 (1921), 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
5Indian courts are legal and are "educational and disciplinary instruments by which
the Government of the United States is endeavoring to improve and elevate the con-
ditions of those dependent tribes to whom it sustains the relation of guardian."
United States v. Clapox, 35 Fed. 575, 577 (D. Ore. 1888).
6Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F.2d 89 (8 Cir.
1956). This case contains an excellent history of the sovereignty theory.
74 STAT. 564 (1832), 25 U.S.C. § 1, 2 (1958). Congress authorized appointment of a
Commissioner who was to have direction and management of all Indian affairs.
'United States v. Clapox, supra note 5.
-25 C.F.R. § 11.46 (1958).
-°25 C.F.R. § 11.40 (1958).
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giving venereal diseases to another.'1 These regulations are more than
directive. They have the dignity of the law of the tribe.'
2
In addition to making th "law," the Bureau provides the means of
enforcement through the Indian police. The Indian police are directly
under the command of the reservation superintendent 3 appointed by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs. The Indian police are thus, in effect, under the
control of the Bureau. The Indian police also serve as an arm of the In-
dian courts as part of their duties includes carrying out the orders of the
Indian courts and preserving order while the courts are in session.
The final link in the chain binding the Indian to the Bureau of In-
dian Affairs is the Indian court. The "regulation" of the Bureau setting
up these courts is as follows:
The regulations in this part relative to Courts of Indian Offenses
shall apply to all Indian reservations on which such courts are
maintained. (b) It is the purpose of the regulations in this part
to provide adequate machinery of law enforcement for those In-
dian tribes in which traditional agencies for the enforcement of
tribal law and custom have broken down for which no adequate
substitute has been provided under Federal or State law.'
4
The Bureau does more than establish Indian courts. For all practical
purposes it is the court. A pertinent regulation provides: "Employees of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, particularly those who are engaged in social
service, health and educational work, shall assist the court, upon its re-
quest, in the preparation and presentation of the facts in the case and in
the proper treatment of individual offenders."' 5 As the judge himself is
a Bureau appointee 16 it is natural for him to make a request for assist-
ance. 7 An opportunity is then presented for Bureau control of the ju-
dicial process from the gathering of evidence through sentencing,
Congress attempted, through the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,19
to protect the Indian from exploitation and to stabilize tribal organiza-
tion. Under this act those tribes who reorganized set up their own courts.
It would seem that the Indian tribes who have reorganized under the act
-25 C.P.R. § 11.63 (1958).
1225 C.F.R. § 11.12 (1958). "Copies of laws. (a) each Court of Indian Offenses shall
be provided with copies of all Federal and State laws and regulations of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs applicable to the conduct of Indians within the reservation."
"The superintendent of each Indian reservation shall be recognized as commander of
the Indian police force and will be held responsible for the general efficiency and
conduct of the members thereof." 25 C.F.R. § 11.301 (1958). The superintendant
also has the authority to appoint the Indian police. 25 C.F.R. § 11.304 (1958).
1'25 C.F.R. § 11.1(a) (1958).
-25 C.F.R. § 11.21(b) (1958).
16"Each judge shall be appointed by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, subject to
confirmation by a two-thirds vote of the tribal council." 25 C.F.R. 11.3(b) (1958).
"7Although judge is used in the singular form, most Indian courts are presided over
by three judges who also perform the jury function.
S2 5 C.F.R. § 11.9 (1958) provided that professional attorneys were not to be allowed
to appear before a Court of Indian Affairs. This was revoked by 26 Fed. Reg. 4361
(1961).
"Wheeler-Howard Act, 48 STAT. 984 (1934), 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1958).
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and established their own courts would be free of the Bureau's control.
Factually, however, such is not the case. The Bureau retains the same
effective control over those tribes which were organized under the Indian
Reorganization Act as they do over other tribes. Most of the constitutions
and by-laws of the organized tribes were prepared by the Bureau and
are the same as the Bureau's own regulations. 20 Even if the Bureau does
not prepare the constitution and by-laws it must approve any constitution
before it becomes the law of the tribe, 21 and may at any time call for an
election for amendment of the constitution.22 In addition, the Bureau
retains the right to set up a court of its own if law and order within the
tribe deteriorate. 23 Finally, the Bureau's "regulations" regarding appoint-
ment of Indian judges and control of Indian police apply equally to those
tribes organized under the Indian Reorganization Act.24 It is apparent
that the Bureau still retains the same control over reorganized tribes as
they do over all Indian tribes.
The Bureau's control over the tribes and the individual Indian is
possible only because the Bureau makes the tribal law and appoints both
the police who enforce the law and the judges who administer the law.
As was stated in the instant case:
[I]t is pure fiction to say that the Indian Courts functioning
in the Fort Belknap Indian community are not in part, at least,
arms of the federal government. Originally they were created by
the federal executive and imposed upon the Indian community,
and to this day the federal government still maintains a partial
control over them.
25
The instant case recognized that the Indian court in question was an
extension of the executive branch of the federal government, and as a
result the federal courts should have supervisory control through a
habeas corpus proceeding. Therefore it was not necessary to pass on the
question of the constitutional rights of an Indian citizen who was also
a citizen of a "sovereign" tribe.
2OThe instant case quoted the appellee's brief which stated, "with only a couple of
differences not material here, the Belknap Law and Order Code was taken bodily
from C.F.R. 11." See also, Oliver, Legal Status of American Indian Tribes, 38 OR.
L. REv. 193, 233 (1959), quoting from a letter written by B. W. Davis to the
author: "at the time this Constitution was adopted there were not 25% of the
Indians (Shoshone-Bannock Tribes) who could read and not more than 2% who
could understand it, and if they could read it, there never was an election with the
required number of adult Indians as required by the Federal Statute on the matter."
He added that, "practically all of the resolutions that are adopted are either pre-
pared or proposed by the Bureau. .... "
2l48 STAT. 987 (1934), 25 U.S.C. 476 (1958).
2248 STAT. 987 (1934), 25 U.S.C. 476 (1958).
nSupra note 14.
-25 C.F.R. § 11.1(d) (1958), states that the Bureau regulations applicable to Indian
judges and Indian police shall continue in effect in those tribes organized under the
Indian Reorganization Act as long as those Indian judges and Indian police are paid
by appropriations made by the United States or until otherwise directed.
"Instant case at 378-79.
[Vol. 26,
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Although courts have recognized that the Indian has some constitu-
tional protection, 26 tribal sovereignty has barred his receiving full Con-
stitutional privileges and protections. For example, it has been held that
first amendment guarantees were not applicable to a tribal ordinance
which prohibited the use of peyote in religious ceremonies. 2  Federal
courts have held that tribal sovereignty was a bar to the applicability of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment in certain instances. They
have refused to take jurisdiction upon a claim that an Indian tribe de-
prived one of its members of his tribal rights without due process.
2 It
has also been held that indictment without a proper grand jury would
not be in violation of the fifth amendment.29  In addition, fourteenth
amendment guarantees have been held not applicable to tribal action, as
the fourteenth amendment was directed to only the states. 30  It would
thus appear that the American Indian is in a constitutional no man's
land, deprived of the protection of the fourteenth amendment because
he is not under a state's jurisdiction, and deprived of the protection of
many of the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal govern-
ment because of his co-existing tribal citizenship.
31
The no man's land in which the Indian finds himself is the result of
an early decision which stated that Congress alone has power to control
"In re Sah Quah, 31 Fed. 327 (D. Alaska 1886), held that slaveholding within the
tribe was unconstitutional.
2Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
Quaere, would the court have come to the same conclusion if the ordinance had been
directed toward a ''conventional" religion?
"'United States v. Senecca Nation of New York Indians, 274 Fed. 946 (W.D.N.Y. 1921)
stated that federal courts had no power to set aside an action of an Indian tribe
confiscating property of a tribal member. C.f. Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe of
Southern Ute Res., 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960 (1958),
reh. denied, 357 U.S. 924 (1958). In this case tribal rights were taken from a
member of the tribe. The court held that although the tribe was organized under the
Tribal Reorganization Act of 1934, it was still a soverign tribe. So far as it appears
from the record the question seemed to be whether reorganization under a federal
act would make the tribe ipso facto a federal agency. The question of government
control per se was not brought out.
'A murder conviction in a tribal court was upheld in Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376
(1896). The Court recognized the procedure under which the defendant was convicted
would have been unconstitutional under the sixth amendment if trial would have been
held in a federal court, but said that it was a matter of due process rather than
a specific Constitutional guarantee. The Court then determined it had no jurisdiction
as the due process clause was part of the fifth amendment, and theh fifth amendment
guarantees did not apply to tribal action.
"United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). There is a rather tenuous line of
reasoning which could make the fourteenth amendment applicable to tribal courts as
well as to the states. It is based on the assumption that the purpose of this amend-
ment was to protect United States citizens who were living within the continental
United States and were also co-citizens of another jurisdiction. The fourteenth amend-
ment was passed in 1868. It was not until 1871, that Congress determined that Indian
tribes were not to be considered as foreign nations, and not until 1924 that Congress
gave citizenship to all Indians. It would follow that the dual citizenship of Indians
was not in general existance at the time the fourteenth amendment was passed. There-
fore the fundamental concept of the fourteenth should apply to Indian tribes as soon
as they became sovereign political bodies comprised of United States citizens living
within the continental United States.
1"The provisions of the Federal Constitution protecting personal liberty or property
rights do not apply to tribal action." Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal
Council, supra note 27, at 134. The court was quoting from one of the most respected
authorities in this field; COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 181 (1942).
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the Indian tribes. Since the congressional power is plenary neither
courts or states have control over the Indian tribes until authorized by
Congress.32 However, in 1953 Congress passed legislation which gave the
states jurisdiction over certain Indian tribes and land, and provided that
the states could, at their option, assume jurisdiction over the tribes in
their geographical area. 33 It would thus seem that Congress has in effect
stated that it no longer has plenary control over the Indian tribes, and
consequently that Indian courts and the Bureau of Indian Affairs should
no longer be able to ignore constitutional guarantees.
The control imposed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs is for the
avowed purpose of helping the Indian gain self determination.3 4 How-
ever every time there is a change in the national administration, the con-
cept of how this goal should be reached changes.3 5 Acts encouraged by
one Commissioner may be made illegal by the next. When this vacillating
policy is added to the Bureau's control, the Indian has no permanent
standard on which he can rely as a guide. This must of necessity hinder
his growth toward self determination.
Submitted: That the Indian citizen must have the protection of con-
stitutional standards before he can gain self determination. In the past
these protections have been denied through the two concepts of tribal
sovereignty and the plenary power of Congress over the tribes. It is
hoped that the instant case is the beginning of a new concept of the Indian
as a citizen, a citizen who is entitled to same constitutional rights,
as all citizens, with these rights guaranteed by the federal courts.
The process of correction and supervision of Indian courts through
the federal courts will place an additional burden on the federal judiciary.
It will be difficult and time consuming to correct procedures in Indian
courts whose judges for the most part know nothing of due process, where
trial by jury is the exception rather than the rule, and where the use of
professional lawyers is discouraged. Yet, in the absence of state juris-
diction, it appears the only way the Indian will receive constitutional
guarantees of due process of law in Indian courts is under the supervision
of the federal courts.
ALDEN PEDERSEN.
32United States v. Kagaina, supra note 30, stated that the power of Congress was plenary
over the tribes and that neither the individual states nor the courts could have juris-
diction until granted by Congress.
-18 U.S.C. 1162 (1958), 28 U.S.C. 1360 (1958).
'One policy of the Bureau of Indian Affairs is said to be the 'termination of Federal
supervision of affairs of Indian tribes desiring such termination, to the extent
practicable and as soon as termination is feasible.'' FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra
note 1, at 501, quoting from the 1954 SEC'Y INT. ANN. REP. 227.
"nSee, Abbot, The American Indian, Federal and State Citizen, 20 FED. B.J. 248, 250-51
(1960), where the author describes Indian affairs as a political football changing
with every federal administration.
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